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Abstract 
This project defines intentionality more comprehensively than the traditional 
understanding by including the unconscjous and unintended social' elements of a text. 
To that .end, I discuss relevant-aspects' of Cultura! Studies including ideology; micro­
culture, and macro-culture while exploring how these elements relate to literature. 
Through examining of the.Gospel.of Luke, I demonstrate that intention is not 
coextensiv� with meaning1 When Luke, or any author, makes a statement, his 
secondary·or latent presuppositions should be almost as important as his primary 
intent in ·determining ultimate meaning. I show that culture and authorship are 
intimately' linked and that a proper reading is one that accounts for unintended 
elements of meaning. 
This project's  primary aim is not an examination of Luke, per se, but is rather 
the examination of the language, ideology, and social factors as they work in and 
·through an author. As a result ofhis unique cultural position, Luke offers an excellent 
text to consider. My aim is not to elevate the theory at the expense of textual analysis 
but, rather, to develop a fuller understanding of the literary doxastic practice and 
thereby come to a fuller understanding of authorship itself. Through all of this, I 
unabashedly promote our interdisciplinary approach as the superlative theory. 
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Introduction 
The object of this text is to enter into the debate over authorial intent's  place 
and prominence in literary theory and criticism. I articulate an understandipgof 
intentionality which accounts for ideological effects on language and artistic craft. 
Such a discussion fits neatly within the boundaries of a New Historicist, Marxist 
paradigm;but my deep ideology1 stc;mce provides a slightly fresher origin. By deep 
ideqlogy, I mean that the cultural influences on an author are so deeply rooted that, 
try as she might, she will never fully escape them. A similar approach has been taken 
by.others, to be sure, but I concentrate on the repercussions of cultural indoctrination 
more closely than most Marxists have done: The human, conditioned from birth to 
speak a given language, falls prey to the presuppositions, mores, and values that are 
encoded within that language. Language is itself an Ideological State Apparatus and a 
given speaker can be subject to myriad, and often conflicting, ideologies depending 
on the homogeneity of his or her culture. When an author seeks to contradict, defy, or 
escape his culture's  prevailing ideologies, we may presume that his success is always 
only partial. In other words, the attentive critic might deconstruct a text to see where 
even the most rebellious of authors betrays a tacit dependence on the hegemonic 
presuppositions that he is rebelling against. I argue for intentionality while 
1 The phrase, "deep ideology," is my own but the underlying concepts are well established in Marxist 
criticism, particularly in the works of Louis Althusser, Stephen Greenblatt, and John Searle. 
simultaneously undermining the common concept of agency. Textual meaning may 
have much to do with an author, but an author is a slave to her culture. 
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Despite my terminology, it should be noted that mine is not a 
Deconstructionist stance. In point of fact, an entire section of my first chapter is 
designed to highlight flaws in this school's operating assumptions. We do not 
deconstruct the text simp1.xbecauseJinguistics is subjective and grants us permission 
to do so. Nor do we deconstruct to prove that language is useless or that all words are 
empty signifiers. To wear such a lens would be to forgo the search for a text's 
ultimate meaning and to focus on the limitless options one finds in the realm of 
interpretive possibility. My position, rather, views ideology as a frozen object­
locked forever in its particular historic moment-that influences, if not dictates, 
textual meaning. The point here is that meaning is not coextensive with intent. What 
an author thinks she is doing (at the moment of articulation) does not comprise the 
entirety of what she has done (when viewed in retrospect). 
One could say that a text's meaning incorporates both the author's conscious 
intent and the ideological intent of her culture. I am tempted to use the phrase 
ideological content instead of intent, for hegemonic influence on language is not 
consciously perpetrated by the bourgeoisie, but neither is it passively contained 
within language. Ideology operates both through our unconscious dependence on 
., 
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hegemonic values and through the cultural-elements encoded in:�anguage.2 The text is 
the .product of its author, to be sure;'bU't the author· is in turn ;1 prodl.lct of her cu1ture. 
To attempt to pull either text or author from the intricate socio-historical context is to 
deny oneself access to. important eletnents <:l'f meaning. 1 
To flesh out my argument, I take a linear and systematic (.though by no :rn��ns 
exhaustive) course that b.egins witH the asset;tiou that theory i& both necessary and_ 
inescapable. I then discuss the shortcomings of-Deconstruction and Reader Response 
theory----u...two popular schools.: whose fixation with subjective affect often takes its toll 
on textual meaning. From here I use Marxist theory, sociology, and sociolinguistics to 
explain how meaning, is -bound up in language and culture and how a proper reading 
must account for certain unconscious ideological components. 
The second half of.my project applies this deep ideology theory to the Gospel 
of Luke, a text whose conflicting cultures make it perfect for such an analysis. While 
this thesis is primarily con·cemed. with theory, i.e., the philosophy behind literary 
examination, and thus my aim is not an overtly religious one, it is necessary to place 
this project within its native context: theological and Biblical studies. 
The adaptation of Marxist literary criticism to the Gospels is a relatively, new 
development This is partly a result of the unique status the Bible has in many of its 
readers' minds. Scholars are reluctant to apply the same critical scalpel to holy 
2 Perhaps the unconscious dependence on ideology results in encoded language or perh�ps it is 
language acquisition that results in ideological indoctrination. We happjly leave that riddle to other 
social scientists. 
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scripture that they have previously used on Homer and Hawthorne. Held by many as 
inerrant, "God-breathed,'•'rand decidedl;t not Uteniturc:; (in the2literatr' s sense of the 
tenn),.the Bible has enjoyed·1ts,own special forms of.critical investigation.3 
Jnval'uable,to my.reconstruc�on of Biblical schoiarship's evolution· has been 
Nicholas'(N.'F�)r.Wpght'.s Jesus:and.the Victory ofCTod. According to Wright, wost 
scholars in.the iast century hav:� "shied .away froin.[' ... ] attempts at [personal' and 
cultural] p6draits"�of.lesus, hecomirig irlstead, "massively anachronistia, busily 
dressing Jesus'.in.horro.wed, ahd higHly unsuitab� dbthesl' (3). These scholars have 
Fittempted td.view Jesus.in a vacuum; refusing to tlraw�ny conclusions· about1his life, 
perSQnality, or cultural· milieu. Wright goes on to- elaim that-
Just as many Jewish,scholarsbave pteferretl'to study T.almud rather 
than Tanakh, -the·r�bbis instead.of�the·Bible;.so the twentieth-centucy 
.Christian theologians have expended more'a:nd more energy on the 
earlychtir.ch andJess and less.upon1Jesus.,[This tactic] �ppeared, after 
aU, safer! .(4)· 
Scholars have not concentrated-pn the Jewish· nature, of Jesus and instead have 
focused on his timeless, "pan-cultural'1:(or� more"{lccurately, "acultural'.') elementg-.-a 
stance conveniently afforded them by "the 'victory of..Alexandrim �hristologyov�r 
3 This is not to say thaf tl;teolo_giqal �;7stigatio�� ar� ";orthless or that the Lukan text should not be 
revered. On the contrary, this paper is written by a staunch theist and, truth be told, the choice of 
' • < IQ l•tr' h 1 I ! " • I \ I l - I f �f' t' � I • � ",-. 
Luke's Gospel was as much personal as it was practical. Contrary to the belief of some, one can be a 
i... , 1 t \ .. ' , • '� r .. 
Marxist and an orthodox 'Chri-stian at the same time. 
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the Antiochenes [so that] the manhood of.Jesus was conc�ived'()f as little more than 
the instrument·of the divine Logos" (Riches 4). The quest for a higlier Christo logy not 
only brought·about the neglect of Christ's human element but all too often scholars. 
"cut off alllhose bits.oHhe 'Jesus' piece that· appeared too Jewish, too.ethnically, 
restricted, leaving [Jesu's] the hero as th'e founder of' a great, universal [ .. :] religion" 
(Wright 6). Thi& scholastic response is as misguid'etl as it is counterintuitive (not to 
mention a bif anti-Semitic). AlthougH a'homogenized, "Everyman" Jesus may be 
appealing to t.Qe evangelist whose job it is to make Christ 'relevant to every culture, it 
essentially denies the core tenets of m¥ theory. Moreover, a view of Jesus that 
denigrates culture relies on the presupposition that scripture is a timeless text, 
completely devoid of any cultural b·aggage. If we can read Jesus out of context, the 
reasoning goes, then why not strip the Gospels of context as well? This ethnocentric 
stance is both ignorant m1d repugnant. According to Wright, 
The Divine Savior to whom [many] pray has only a tangential 
relationship to first-century Falestine, and they intend to' keep it that 
way. [Jesus] can, it seems, be worshipped, but if he ever actually lived, 
he was a very strange figure, clothed in white while all around wore 
drab, on his face a perpetual faraway expression of pious solemnity. 
This icon was one means by which Victorian devotion ttied to cope 
with Enlightenment rationalism. (9) 
Scholars like Martin Kahler and Rudolf Bultmann were famous for "stripping away 
the layers of Jewish apocalyptic mythology" from the Jesus narratives in a way which 
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could only imply th�n the theologian, in their minds, tmmped the 1historian (Wright 
I 5). By tuming•"J.esus of Nazareth" into "Jesus the Timeless Icon,:' many excuse 
themselves from the arduous, task of reconstructing the Bible's original social context. 
P.erhaps the first seholar to think the humanity of Jesus a matter.o£ '!JlY real 
import was the Deist, Hermann Samuel Reimar:us .. Reimarus' works, published 
posthumouslY; pondered what Jesus' words might have meant in their original 
Hellenized Hebrew "Gontext (Riches 1 �3). ,Taking a decidedly marginal view, 
Reimarus taught that Jesus came to ·reform ludaism and that it was only after his 
death that· his followers decided to make a new religion with its own ethos (Riches 4). 
Lessing, the man who compiled· and published Reimarus' work, picked up,the 
cultural�context torch in·his Educatiem ofMankirrd. According to JohnRiches, 
Lessing implies tha't 
philosoph)' may be the way to truthlfor a few individuals, but for the 
vast mass of people advances in the truth are brought through religious 
[ ... ] doctrines. If this is so, then a number of points follow. First, 
religious teaching must by nature be couched in terms that are 
intelligible to the people in the community to whom it is addressed, 
not in terms of 'timeless, necessary truths of reason.' Secondly, 
because religion is a constant process of education; the-great.religious 
teachers will be concerned to [ ... ] express new truths in terms of their 
existing religious vocabulary." (8) 
Lessing essentially puts Scripture back into perspective: Even if Christ did come to 
start a new faith, he would still be forced to use existing religious language and 
metaphor in order to get his points across. If one could somehow excuse Jesus from 
this linguistic necessity on the grounds of his divinity, he or she could not grant 
similar allowances to Jesus' audience. The nature of the medium requires compmnal 
relevance. If a larger, universal application exists, it must be gotten at through a 
proper understanding 'of the original reception and not by denying the relevance of 
that reception. Lessing makes room for my Marxist, culture-bound contribution to 
this biblical discussion. 
Reimarus and Lessing had a lasting effect on the scholastic community. 
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Johannes Weiss and Albert Schweitzer wrote on the significance of understanding the 
Bible in its original context and, thereafter, this became an increasingly common 
tactic (Wright 4). Between world wars, however, theologians directed attention 
elsewhere. Wright tells us that 
Bultmann in his way, and Karl Barth in his, ensured that little was 
done to advance genuine historical work on Jesus[ ... ]. Attention was 
focused instead on early Christian faith and experience, in the belief 
that there, rather than in a .dubiously reconstructed Jesus, lay the key to 
the divine revelation that was presumed to have taken place in early 
Christianity. (22) 
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In this paper, I am not attempting tb·lo9ate the.bistoric J.esus, per se, but by putting 
Luke's Gospel back into its cultural moment I will, perforce, reconstruct the message 
of Jesus. 
More important to my cause thill] t1ite �ociq-his!w-JA fo1p1der of Christianity is, of 
course, Luke's portrayal of Jesus' life and message. Luke, after all, was writing 
between q2,finp 85 C.E.----;:def<ld�S-Jlfter Jysuf zpi11is.tzy (Keener 321). When J.-�ke sat 
down to writ$! ,aQ "orderl� {!�count:' for �i§ pa,t:rgn, Theop,hilus (Lukti, I .1 ), the 
Christian �ect h�d ah:eaqy. become a religion i:q. its. own ri�t, defining its�lf within 
and agaiQst th� S!"e(\ter �9cial network of Rome and JerusJl em. Divine reyel,ation may 
be found in "early. <;hristiap f�jth and experience" or it may be in the personhqod of 
Jesus,pfNaz&ret]:l.JWhile,theologians puzzle this out, we literary theorists may say 
with confidei).Ce tpat .the depiction of Jesus and t)le (ext11al re":el�tiop.,of Christian 
ideo)ogy i:; n��ssarilyJocked in the culture '!fld l�guage of)h€{ Bibljcal �uthors. In 
sum, my text h(\s-relevml;cejn both literary theory �n,d Biblical <;:riticisrn circles 
because of its dependence on cultural theory. 
We shall ,begin qy di�<;ussjng the importance of tht1ory itself, focusi,ng on its 
inescapabJe pr�sence whe:q.evert}le,human mind engages an unknown object�p,_ch as a 
text. From there I shall explain why some of the current schools of criticism are ill­
equipped to engage the cultural conwo11ent of authorship. Nex.t � sh�ll.��pl�tn tl}5 . 
��ep ideolO$Y tl).eory befory employing �t to exar,nin� Luke's g_osp�l. In.l.u�.e� I shaU 
ttp�e. q�th .h,is conscious, and his unconscious pependence on the larger H�lleniz¥a 
culture ofg.is q�Y·, :. . , 
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Part I: Theory and Authorship 
Chapter 1 
The Importance ofTheory 
As this is being written, many students and professors would tell me that 
theory is unimportant and that I should forget it and focus my attention elsewhere. If I 
was given a dollar for every time someone rolled their eyes when I mentioned theory 
in the classroom, I would be writing this thesis from a private beach house in East 
Hampton. One could not throw a stone into the average American Lit classroom 
without hitting at least three people who thought that studying theory was passe. 
Perhaps these folks are jaded by the theory frenzy of previous generations or maybe 
they simply believe that meaning is self-evident in a text. Whatever their motivation, 
the instigators of this grassroots revolution do a disservice to the literary discipline. 
To claim that we are somehow beyond theory--or beyond the necessity of 
articulating theory-is in effect, to throw entire departments of professors out on their 
ears and to slam shut the book of literary debate that has been open since before 
Plato's time. 
It has become increasingly prudent, if tedious, to begin any serious scholarly 
exercise with a defense of theory itself. As we shall see, theory is not only important, 
but it is indispensable and-much to my peers' chagrin- it is inescapable. We use 
theory on a daily basis because theorizing is hard-wired into the human mind. As 
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fatigued as some might be by the previous few decades' endless quest for bigger and 
better theories, there are still myriad questions that need to be asked whenever we 
approach a text-questions whose answers betray theoretical bias and pit us one 
against another. 
It is easy to sympathize with the shell-shocked veterans of the theory wars. 
After all, thorny questions about the nature of the text and the roles of author and 
reader have kept otherwise peaceful scholars at each others' throats for decades. I 
recall a professor whose feminism was so fierce that any paper lacking inclusive 
language automatically dropped a letter grade and another whose allegiance to New 
Criticism made extra-textual sources anathema. Theoretical battle lines divide 
colleagues within and between institutions and frighten entire freshmen literature 
classes into becoming engineering majors. Yet theory is as important as texts 
themselves because it is in the theory that we see human craft analyzed by human 
reason. Not only is theory necessary, it is exceedingly helpful in increasing our 
knowledge about human thought and action. Moreover, as I discuss below, one's 
choice of theoretical bias is crucial and some schools of thought are more worthy of 
our attendance than others. Although I am not sufficiently arrogant to think my 
particular project a theoretical coup de grace, I unabashedly assert the supremacy of 
my theory. So, with apologies to the quivering masses of new engineering students, 
I admit from the beginning that I do not bring peace, but a sword. 
To begin our discussion of theory we must consider epistemology. It is 
important to remember that theory is more the property of philosophy than ofliterary 
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circles and, as such, it is proper to discuss it on philosophy's  terms� Theory, after all, is 
an organized system ,.of propositions which attempts to explain a set of phenomena. 
Theories are heuristic tools that we use to order the seeming chaos of nature. All 
theories, including literary ones, are technically "doxastic practices." The philosopher 
William Alston describes these practices "as a sy.stem or constellation of dispositions or 
[ . . .  ] 'mechanisms', each of which yields a belief' (Alston, Perceiving 153). Put another 
way, doxastic practices are socially transferr�d mechanisms for forming beliefs about 
our surr.t)undings:: These practices are mental constructs that humans use to help 
rationalize the world. They are best-fit models. They are inventions. They have 
within them certain limitations w.hich nught to be. discussed. 
Alston tells us that doxastic practices have a level of intrinsic circularity 
because they depend on their own:st<�tedq>resuppositionS-+nd theory being able to 
rest entirely on a priori truths. This concept requires SOJI\e unpacking. Alston uses 
sense perception (i.e., the trust we have in our cognitive ability to properly translate 
raw sense data) as an example of a doxastic practice that cannot validate its worth 
without presupposing its own validity (Episteniic 6). You can trust that the objects 
you see are actually there only by relying on your own sense perception or another 
individual' s  corroborative sense perception. Alston writes that 
you form the perceptual belief that there is a goldfinch just.outside the 
kitchen window, basing your belief on your sense experience. in. the 
usual way [ ... ] .  Your belief is correct. But' how do I know your belief 
is correct? The most obvious way. is to take a look myself to see 
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whether there really is a goldfinch there. But then 1 am relying on the 
reliability of sense perception in order to amass my evidence. In 
supposing that J have ascertained in each case that the perceptual 
belief under examination is correct, 1 have assumed that my sense is 
yielding true beliefs. Thus I am assuming [that sense experience is a 
'reliable source of perceptual beliefs] in adducing evidence for it, and 
so it would appear that my argument is circular. (Epistemic 6) 
Because of this circularity we have difficulty adjudicating between theories. After all, 
each seems to be subjective-a matter of taste, not of debate. Although Alston's 
goldfinch example is a simple (or at least more subconscious) doxastic practice, its 
more complex cousins also suffer the same circularity. Each doxastic practice 
validates itself and each theory is as good as the next. Many do not wish to adhere to 
the dogma of one school or another for exactly this reason. Wringing their hands in 
despair or, more likely, slouching in their armchairs of academic apathy, too many 
people abandon theory. 
It is true that one may never find flawless proof of one practice's validity, 
but that does not mean that we may paint the walls of academia with relativism. 
Return for a moment to Alston's example. Using complex argumentation, Alston 
proves that sense perception (and all doxastic pr..actic.es) cannot be validated by an 
appeal to a priori truths (Epistemic 8-9). And yet, we do not go about our lives 
denying the reliability of our eyes and ears. Science itself is based on empiricism 
and we could not trust it if we doubted the validity of the human senses. 
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Doxastic circularity is overcome by faith-proper, warranted faith that rests 
on. some basic presuppositions (e.g., that our senses do not, as a rule, lie to us, etc.). 
It is important that we base our doxastic faith on whatis warranted. A warranted 
belief is one which pragmatism and.probability .support. I maY" tmst'my ,eyes· an9, my 
ears because they have serV-ed me well enough in the past (pragmatism): .and because 
it is enormously more probable that my eyes are functioning properly than to • 
suppose that some magical trickster is painting'false images on my retina 
(probability). 
Probability and'pragmatism are tools that not only allow us to trust certain 
doxastic practices; but also may actually help to establish one theory's superiority 
over another. When adjudicating between practices, one must pragmatically employ 
probability. In other words, which theory does not obviously defy the author's 
probable intent or the reception group's likely reading? This is not to say·that·all 
subsequent interpretations are limited by the boundaries of that first author,audience 
connection, but one must not espouse a reading that entirely contradicts that 
interaction either. This immediately discounts the ramblings of some of the more· 
imaginative DeconstructiQnists-·a group which cares little for pragmatism.and 
chooses, rather, to put its stock in lii®Iistic possibility. Although they may be 
playful, they go too far when they defy the author's probable intent and the 
reception group's probable interpretation.4 
4 We assume, here, the belief that meaning is a product of the author's)ntent, language, and historic 
moment. Accordingly, that for which the Deconstructionist searches in the text is not textual meaning 
14 
Another way in which probability influences our choice of theories is 
through an interdisciplinary approach. If we shake off the trappings of Westem 
discrete thinking, we can come to a holistic view of humanity and human craft. 
Common sense tells us that a human text stemming from a human mind is going to 
have human qualities. So the social sciences which contemplate the mind should 
inform our literary doxastic practice. Findings in sociology and linguistics cannot be 
ignored for they reveal much about artistic craft and human communication. It is 
highly probable that the mind, as described by these sciences, is influenced by 
language change, ideology, and culture. It is also highly probable that the 
humanities have more in common with each other than they do in contrast and that 
the best understanding of one field will corroborate -or at least not defy- the 
discoveries of its fellow fields. 5 
If corroborative evidence from nonliterary fields can point to the superlative 
literary doxastic practice, we should feel obliged to embrace that practice as the 
most nearly ideal (i.e. the most pragmatic). This tactic, however, is often frowned 
upon. The New Critics, for example, are infamous for their desire to seek a "pure" 
reading of a text, clinically detached from the author or the text's larger context. 
per se, but textual effect or textual significance. These concepts are more fully discussed in the 
following chapter. 
5 Indeed, corroborative evidence from unrelated fields is known as the "convergence principle" in 
sociolinguistics, and a careful investigator looks for such evidence to increase the probability that 
his/her hypotheses are correct. For more on this seeR. Bell's Sociolinguistics: Goals, Approaches, and 
Problems. London: Batsford, 1 976. 
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Even the more adventurous critics will eventually draw the line and warn us against 
stepping beyond the natural borders of our discipline. The Western mind has a 
penchant for ordering the universe into smaller and smaller categories until we have 
strict and inflexible barriers separating the discourses. History is expected to stay 
removed from philosophy and literary studies is expected to keep a distance from 
sociology. To blur the lines intentionally is seen as adding extraneous confusion to 
one's studies. In "The Threads of Literary Theory," Joseph Margolis writes that 
From time to time one discipline or another tends to become 
noticeably untidy. It betrays a certain shameless interest in ideas 
intended for other disciplines; sooner or later we all become 
beneficiaries, protected to an extent by the monitored fait accompli, 
from having to justify our own ranging across breached professional 
lines. This sort of fecund piracy has been gathering force in literary 
theory. (1) 
This interdisciplinary theft is now common procedure. Many defy the older, discrete 
thinking and opt, instead, for a more organic view ofhumanity and creativity. 
There is nothing untidy or scandalous about interdisciplinary dialogue. As 
necessary as it may be to separate biology from psychology, for example, one must 
sometimes consider both of them in order to diagnose a patient safely. Similarly, 
there is no need to cut off literary theory from the social sciences for there is nothing 
about them that demands such an unnatural separation. To understand the product of 
human creativity, we must factor in what other fields tell us about humanity and the 
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creative process: ScHhe best literary theory will not unduly silence other disciplines 
but will rather seek to align itself with them in a meta-discipline that attempts to 
understand the Hhuman" from every angle. 
Another obstacle that keeps literary types from serious theoretical 
investigation is.that the quest for troth and for knowledge often becomes secondary 
to personal aims·and ideological agendas. Even i(one could prove that a given 
theory best explains the phenomenon of literature, many would ignore it and pr�fer 
those-theories whi9h support, their own inclinations. I have witnessed many scholars 
wrench a text's·arm behind its back to bully an interpretation from it that is neither 
textually itnplicit.ot.contextually.explicit. One such person chose to retrofit a Mary 
Wollstonecraft idealism onto·a1very early stage of women's letters which predated 
but did not predict_.her "Vindication of the Rights of Women.?' Usually the'cause of 
such maneuvers. is tlie'presuppositioh that every culture and:every historic moment 
secretly sympathizes :with t]le postmodem reader�s ideals. We see the recent film 
adaptation.of  Little Women supplantingtMarmy's hearth-and-home patriarchal 
leanings with a suffragist zeal for fem�le power. While this revisionist approach 
may reinforce our personal tastes, it is hardly professional. The most respectable 
methodology wiU:not hold tqe current culture as the. standard but will impartially 
reconstruct· the historic moment· of a text's articulation and on that base an 
inteipretation. 
If readers have to ground their interpretations in the rigorous study of 
history, culture, and the like, they become increasingly aware that some readings 
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are just not·defensible. Accordingly, some shrug off our entire interdisciplinary 
argume11t. When backed into a corner, they may even try to deny the practicality of 
theory itself .. To adjudicate between theories is tiresome, and would require much of 
them, so they shrink from their philosophic duty and cuckold academic integrity. As 
scholars, it is our responsibility to find the most ideal theory and to employ it 
regardless of the. toll it may take. on our personal philosophies. We depend on 
theories so they:might.as well he solid�and even those who would claim that they 
are without literary creed betray a theoretical bias. 
Any time the human mind engages the chaos of nature, be it on a mountain 
or on a page, it must extract meaning by creating epistemic bridges between the 
known and the unknown. Through an internal and often subconscious process, our 
minds apply theocy to life on a daily basis. So while one might claim that she 
follows no school of theory, she is doubtless speaking the party rhetoric of one 
camp or another and is simply unaware of it. Doxastic practices are necessary and 
unavoidable. In most of literary cases, the individual is following the lead of 
Stanley Fish, Louise Rosenblatt, Wolfgang Iser, and other Reader Response critics. 
Such scholars place the locus of meaning at the point of contact between the text 
and the reader, thus rendering meaning a slippery and subjective thing and allowing 
the reader to focus on their personal reaction rather than the social context. Readers 
are drawn to this because it is less concerned with meaning or intent than it is with 
response. It does not consider the text as a social artifact and it obstinately refuses 
t 
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to articulate a metliodology that {;ah be properly engaged in deb'ate.6 Jnterpretation, 
some say, is response and response is· necessarily subjectill.e"--:-:-.ergo why.;belalror 
theory? ·While some readers·shy away from•discussing,them;y, they. nonetheless 
depend on it and,-more's the pity; frequently find themselv.esjn.a school such.as 
this: a school that often negle<ttSilarge .asp.eC!s oflextual fonrlation, sacrificing.tl},em 
to the impossible belief thaLmeaning is in the eye.of the beholder. 
� The impression• that a.text·makes on a reader. should not be completely 
ignored but I think :it unwise to .claim that t�e most important aspe€ts of meaning 
are found in subjective response. "What the text means'\and "what the text means 
to me" _are not, synonymous phrases· and should not be used interchangeably. Reader 
Response :is not the .only literary theory. that covets too narrpw ,a 'Scope. In point of 
fact, it may: be said that most other theories are types of ReaderrResponse Criticism 
that merely insist on directing. interpretative focus to one minute concern or the 
other. After all, what is a Feminist interpretation i:t:not the response of a critic who 
is sensitive to feminist concerns, highlighting them in his textual analysis? And is 
not a traditional Marxise interpretation the response of a reader who is concerned 
6 ' 'I I ' For what would one say to the critic whose credo is that the individual reader is coauthor of a text's 
relevance and significance? The operating presupposition discredits the searclf for the "best'' ' 
interpretation because it does not-place meaning within the text's semantic a� hist9ri� IllOJilent;}mt in· 
tp.e reade(� aesthetic, subjective moment. 
7It should be pointed out that I am myself a Marxist. However, my particular brand of theory (which 
straddles Cultural Poetic& and New Historicism) ·is less a·Reader Response variation' as it is a set of 
beliefs about textual ontology-I do not begin with my reaction but with the nature of the text as a 
1 9  
witheconomics;.class.warfare, and the like,,being sensitive to them in he!' reflection 
on·the text? lt•is not unimportant. to consider howtth�:xreadergets on with.the text, 
but it is dangerous to·stop one>'�·analysiswith -this,initial response and.to claim that 
meaningis constitutt!d in .viscer�treaction. Likew,ise, it is not.inhereiltl�·wroilg .. to 
consider p·text' s portray,al of ,gender roles and,. relationships, but if such a reading is 
at the expense of other textual and contextual elements, one does a disservice to the 
text. My point is not to belittle these schools, per se, but to assert that bringing one's 
agenda to a text often makes one see ideological phantoms and to impose his or her 
own cultural moment's assumptions on another culture's text. Literary analysis 
needs to escape this "reader as coauthor" mentality and return to an informed 
exegetical approach that tries to clear its mind of all assumptions save those that are 
known to have existed at the time of textualisation. We forget that the text was the 
intellectual property of the author long before we encountered it. Our reactions may 
be valid and important, but they should not lead our analysis. 
The notion that meaning is secondary to response depends upon to the 
erroneous presupposition that the reader's reaction to carbon black ink on white 
paper is the only (or at least the best) thing that can be taken from a text. This 
implies that a text's primary use is to entertain and not, as may be the case, to 
increase our knowledge about humanity and culture. The problem, as I see it, is that 
too many readers think of a text as a finished product and, giving little if any 
social artifact. I seek to uncover the historic moment of textualisation and aUow that to dictate my 
reading. 
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thought to its actual construction, attempt to read meaning into the text rather than 
extracting it from the text. To begin to understand textual analysis, one must first 
have a proper understanding of (and a proper respect for) the text. To that end, we 
must direct our attention more specifically to the particular claims of certain literary 
schools, pointing out their limitations and weaknesses. 
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Chapter 2 
The Limitations of Tr aditional Views 
In critiquing traditional approaches to literary theory, particularly as they 
relate to authorial intent, one could do worse than to begin with intentionality's  
champion, E.D. Hirsch. Hirsch's 1 960 article, "Objective Interpretation," masterfully 
defends the role of the author in determining textual meaning. Insofar as I agree that 
conscious intent is crucial to a proper reading, I accept the Hirschian methodology 
with the few, if significant, provisos (discussed in the next chapter). Hirsch 
presupposes that the author has more control over her language than the social 
sciences might suggest. Nevertheless his thoughts on the literary doxastic practice 
make a sufficient platform from which I shall unleash my own critical arrows. My 
goal, after all, i s  not to eradicate intentionality but to broaden it, chiding those 
theories which exclude intention and intention' s  social accoutrements. 
It has been my claim that meaning is not coextensive with intention. Hirsch 
draws an equally helpful distinction in "Objective Interpretation." He posits that 
textual meaning and textual significance are two discrete entities (Hirsch 1 686). So as 
not to confuse Hirsch's comparatively narrow concept of meaning with our broader,  
social one, I will use Sinn, the term that Hirsch borrows from Gottlob Frege, to 
signify "textual meaning" and Bedeutung to mean "textual significance" ( 1 686). 
Bedeutung is tied up in the culture of the reader and will necessarily shift as the 
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society evolves.8 Sinn, however, is static and objective and is the direct product of the 
author's  intention (Hirsch 1690). 
To explain the difference between Sinn and Bedeutung, Hirsch imagines a red 
object held in front of differently colored backgrounds. The object is the Sinn and the 
interplay between its red and the background' s  coloPwill change depending on 
whatever the hue of the background happens to he at the time. This interplay is the 
Bedeutung and is, through the innate s;ubjectiyity of human response, fluid. However, 
Hirsch rightly points out that "the analogy with colored objects is only partial [ . . . ] .  
Tex.tual,meaning i s  a construction, not a naked given like a red object, and [we] 
cannot relate textual meaning to a larger realm until [we] have construed it" ( 1 689). 
Thus it may be helpful to study how a text's  Bedeutung changes over time, but that 
change is only fully realized when one can first grasp the text's Sinn. 
I agree with Hirsch th;:tt far too many schools of interpretation refuse to 
concede the existence of Sinn, much less to recognize its importance to theory. 
Hirsch's argument·is against "modem theories which hamper the establishment of 
normative principles in interpretation and which thereby encourage the subjectivism 
and individualism which have for many students discredited the analytic movement" 
( 1 687). As we shall see, one may acknowledge the slipperiness oflanguage and the 
8 Hirsch comes to this "protean view'' of significance by applying to "interpretation certain [ . . . ] 
insights from linguistics and philosophy" (1686). So, prima facie, I will have much more in common 
with Hirsch than with those theorists who call for a rigid separation between the disciplines. 
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interpretive subjectivity.of Bedeutung while.not'falling into the reductio ad absurdum 
trap of absolute subjectivity. There is no freedom in denying $inv. As Hirsch puts it 
the significance of textual meaning has no foundation [ . . .  ] unless 
meaning itself.is unchanging. J:o fuse meaning and significance, or 
interpretation and· criticism, by. the conception of an autonomous, 
living, changing meaning·does not really free1:hereader from the 
shackles ofliistoricism; it simply destroys the basis both for any 
agreement among readers and for·anyobjecthte·study1whatever. ( 1 688) 
This argument seems to beleveled,at both.the Reader>Response theorists and·the 
Deconstructionists, i.e.; those schools which do not posit·the existence .of mearting as 
separate from significance. 
Deconstruction Theory:[Sinn]ers in.the Hands of an Angry Theorfst> 
There seems to.be a pattern among literary theorists�a,penchant for 
structuring e ssays and articles ar.ound two terms. I use "meaning"· and "intent," Hirs.ch 
uses "Sinn" and "Bedeutung," aridRoland Barthes chooses·"work" and "tex('•1o ·1 
make·his  case. The shift from Structqralism to post-structural Deconstr.Uctjd.nism'� 
be traced in Barthes' body of criticism. Through exploring the interplay'..b.eiwctm 
connotation and denotation; signifier· and signified, Rarthes.at;td the; , .. � r 1 � : 
Dec'onstructionists write witty, sportive .essays.about textu!ll interpretation that smack 
too much.ofrelativis� to suit·a critic like Hirsch� 1 '  I(' ,. t \-.,., .... 
A .. work," for Barthes, is the physical object-the book, the poem, etc.­
while the "text" is a living and active thing, "experienced only in an activity of 
production" (1471). The text, we are told, 
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is not a co-existence of meanings but a passage, an overcrossing; thus 
it answers not to an interpretation, even a liberal one, but to an 
explosion, a dissemination. [ .. . ] the Text depends, that is, not on the 
ambiguity of its contents but on what might be called the 
stereographic plurality of its weave of signifiers. (Barthes 14 72) 
In other words, Barthes would have us believe that texts cannot be wrangled into any 
fixed interpretation, but must be allowed to move and bend with semantics and 
language change. It is important here to note the relationship between signifiers and 
signifieds. Prior to Barthes and his peers, many held the belief that a signifier (a 
phonetic or textual marker) was assigned to a signified (an ol:Jjective concept) with a 
more or less one-to-one correspondence. When one discusses a tree, he or she uses an 
arbitrary label (tree) for a collection of attributes and images that transcend language 
and have a real, ontological basis (Saussure 964). Words are mere referents for these 
"transcendental signifieds." The heart of the Deconstruction school is the assertion 
that signifieds have no transcendent qualities and, as subjective items, they lack that 
one-to-one correspondence-a notion borrowed from Structuralist Ferdinand de 
Saussure and championed by the prominent French critic Jacques Derrida (de Man 
15 I 6; Bressler 123). It is with this Post-structural mentality that Barthes embraces the 
"stereo graphic plurality" of signifiers-his theory rests in "difference" and linguistic 
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possibility. Paul de Man even goes so far as to claim that "rhetoric radically suspends 
logic and opens up vertiginous possibilities of referential aberration" such a way that a 
given "sentence has at least two meanings, of which the one asserts and the other denies 
its own illocutionary mode" ( 15 1 9-20).9 
Of course even the most relativistic critic would admit that a given piece of 
writing has an intended effect and is thence subject to some authorial linguistic 
restraints. Barthes escapes this trap by claiming that "the author is reputed the father 
and owner ofhis work: literary science therefore teaches respect for the [ . . .  ] author 's 
declared intentions [but] as for the Text [however], it reads without the inscription of 
the father" (1473). So while a work is confined by intentionality, the lauded "Text" is 
different and free from authorial constraints. Here  we see certain shared 
presuppositions between Deconstructionists and Reader Response critics. Both would 
repeat those famous words of Horace, that "words once uttered forget the way home." 
What these critics also presume in common is that the text should trump the work in 
establishing effect. Moreover, ultimate meaning (if it exists) is  not as important as 
personal interpretation. Such critics are decidedly not [Sinn ] ers-theirs is the realm of 
Bedeutung. 
9 I fmd this particularly amusing. Apparently language violates the law of non-contradiction every day. 
If a given sentence can mean A and -A at the same time, how can we have any faith in 
communication? If this were the case, then we'd expect dialogue to be a very tedious and difficult 
task-for every thing we said could conceivably be its own antithesis! The entire premise is rather 
absurd and yet de Man would have us believe that this is the nature of language. 
As freeing as .it may be to ignore Sinn and 1o focus on the "fatherless" text, 
one must consider the purpose of such a pursuit. It seems obvious that the so-called 
Adamic principle of linguistics is flawed-the process of naming beingjtself an 
artificial categorization of nature's chaos in order to force meaning onto existence. 
Humans name things in an attempt. to master them. The Deconstructionists rightly 
deflate human ego by painting out that nature is not so tidy as to fit easily into 
discrete .categories. There: is po transcendental Tree,. but there are trees. Things have 
commonality but they also have difference. Language is fluid, it changes with the 
times, and it defies the rigidity of those prescriptive academics who would use it to 
fence in nature's wilderness. On the other hand, language is a very useful tool. We 
need not blindly follow a pre-Saussurian allegiance to rigid sign/signifier pairs, but 
why go to the opposite extreme? Why render language futile by using it to 
deconstruct itself? 
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It seems to me that the Deconstructionists blame language for being an 
artifice. This is tantamount to discovering a spade in the woods, looking it over and 
then concluding that since it obviously did not sprout from the ground, it is useless to 
us. Of course the spade is not organic. Of course it is an artifice. Being a human 
invention, it has intrinsic failings and limitations. And yet it is a spade and is useful 
for digging holes. Just as one must have a certain amount of faith in the utility and 
reliability of doxastic practices, she must likewise have faith that language, though 
flawed, is useful and mostly reliable for communicating one's point. As I see it, there 
is little pragmatism behind Deconstruction theory because it points out linguistic 
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limitations without explaining why those limitations are important, if they are 
probable, and how their revelation might aid man's quest to better understand 
himself.10 Moreover, lam not entirely convinced that those linguistic limitations are 
quite as severe as Barthes et al. would have us believe. 
There is, in sociolinguistics, a concept known as "prototyping." According to 
theorists like E. Rosch and R.A. Hudson, humans, with a refreshing amount of 
universality, hold in mind typical instances-or "prototypes" of given objects-a set of 
core concepts against which subsequent, differentiated items might be defined 
(Wardhaugh 236). The prototypical bird, for example, more resembles a robin than it 
does a toucan, an ostrich, a penguin, or an eagle in almost every cultural setting 
(Wardhaugh 236). Wardhaugh writes that "a variety of experiments has shown that 
people do in fact classify [ . . .  ] objects ofvarious kinds according to" prototypes and 
that "the remarkably uniform behavior that people exhibit in such tasks cannot be 
accounted for by a theory; which says that concepts are formed from sets of defining 
features" (236). Our prototypal bird is not merely the collection of particulars like 
"beak," "wing," "feathers," etc. If this were the case, then prototypes would not exist 
as such. Instead we'd have some people's quintessential bird as an ostrich and others 
as a dodo. Barthes, in short, would have won the day. A prototype, however, is a 
10 We might add that the Deconstructionist not only declares the spade useless, but she uses it to dig its 
own grave. It is with marked absurdity that these critics use language to undermine the effectiveness of 
language. One is reminded of the young student who would argue against the usefulness of logic, all 
the while using induction, deduction, and debate to prove his point. 
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common.and central. image-we think o£roljiris b�caqse birds of itst�i'ze, shape, and 
habits are found the wtirld-over in remarkable numbers: Tf.lle prototype i_s,akin.to a 
Platonic form in .tflis·respecL The fact that we employ prototypes with ease and with 
regularity and that these prototypes stem from objects that are typical, common, 
everyday; and straightforward, .has a dev(\stating effeCt on a doxastiC. pt..actice like 
deconstructionism. 
To retum to a previous example; there niay.be.llo.absolute i\nage of a tree,!,but 
there.is indeed a prototypal one..,.-a tt:ee that.res�ble� an:.average, common tree like 
an elm rather than its diminuti¥e friend the bonsai. Perhaps no one-to-.one 
correspondence exists .between this signified ·and our wo:rd "tree;" but the tree image 
is not.formed from the sewing together of a�tributes, .but from·some intemal, nearly 
primal (and almost universal) epistemological tendency. Thete will be:\(ariation 
betweeti people's prototypes, but the mental images will have much more in common 
than in contrast. So Barthes? stereographic plurality, which rests on near .limitless 
possibility, seems to·be·less and less practical when viewed in light of prototype 
theory. 
This should restrict a Deconstructionist reading, hindering it from straying too 
far from the original message that its language employed. It is possible for the written 
word to betray the author's ·intent in some instances, but that does not mean that one 
may justifiably forgo the 'study of intentionality altogether. 'The notion 'that the truest 
meaning will be.close,to the original communicated messl,\ge seems·so evident that it 
is practically a truism . .  The written word can be trusted, most of the time, to 
29 
commtmicate messages adequately�.Although language �stra:i.ots rpightallow for 
wider interpret�tions, these Barthian '"obj�€ts of possibility" have little pr..actical value 
and contribute little to. critical dialogue. 
. .  ' 
A ·Fish Olfl of Wptr:r: Readex Re,.Ypon.'i,eYJnd the Redpefor Relativism , 
., ' "  . 
In "Interpreting the Variorum," Stanley Fish, .the self-styled father of Reader 
Response criticism, write.s·.tha! tb.e "tranpfeoing of resp:onsibility from the text to its 
readers is what the, (jext] asks us to do" and that this response "is therefore what the 
[text] means" (2074). He goes on to claim that the; "structure of the reader's 
experience rather than any structure on.th� page" is, what determines a given 
interpretation (Fish 207 4). When confronted with. the jssue of U!tentiQ.lla}ity, Rish 
cl&ims that 
to construct the profile of the informed [ . . .  ] reader is  at the same time 
to categori�e the. author's intention and vice versa, because to do either 
is  to ·specizy the cpntemporary conditions of. utterance, to identify,. by 
becorping·a member of,. a community made up,ofthos.e who share 
interpreta.tiv'e strategies. ·(2081 )  
This i s  Reader.Respo.nse criticism in its most condensed form .. Ac.cotding to.:this 
school, one's reading·will ·depend on whathe brings to ih.e.table-what �xpetiences 
and insights his unique existence has -added to the teJS.t'.s sjgp.tfj.w:ij:ipu. AnQther 
famous Reader Response critic, Wolfgang lser, formalizes this process. Calling it the 
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GAP. theory, Iser,_.claims that "the reader fills in the blank in·:.the t�xt" tijat exists 
between-the word on the page and the eognitive processing of it ( 1 68 1 ). According to 
Iser, "the literary work has twCYpoles, which we might call the arttstic [i.t.Lthe 
author's text] and the aesthetic,'\i.e., the "realization accomplished.by:the.reader," 
and that textual significance lies SOJllewhere in the middle ( 1 674). In sum, Re$ponse 
criticism gives · the feadez:. prominence in the- interpretative·process and admits that 
meaning will be-determined PY the experiences ofthe'reader's community. 
Fish's·"interpr.etative community" is, as we shaH see, very similar to the 
sociolinguist's "speech· community," a notion that I borrow to flesh out my own 
theory. Likewise, Iser's description of gap-filling. is in keeping with what modern 
psychology has to say about the learning process. While there are theoretical bits with 
which I take no issue, however, in practice the Reader Resporise!c'ritic places much 
more emphasis on the aesthetic than on the artistic. Sinn once again .takes .a backseat 
to Bedeutung. 
One must ask oneself what Fish means by the "informed" reader or what 
many critics have labeled the "ideal reader." Such a reader is knowledgeable about 
the original linguistic context of a given work of literature and has the necessary 
faculties to follow authorial intent in a text. In short, the ideal reader will be in an· 
interpretive community that is sufficiently similar to the author's and thus her 
response will be nearly synonymous with the original intention. So far, I have only 
reiterated Fish's own claims. One of this school's greatest shortcomings, however, is 
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that many of its adherents are far from ideal and have increasingly suggested that the 
reader need not be quite so informed after all .  
Most of the reader response rank and file seem to,be younger students who 
have had very little theory or jaded academicians who have had too much of it. If 
every critic who subscribes to this particular doxastic practice were as thorough -illld, 
meticulous as Stanley Fish, I would have veJy few problems with response theories_ 
Y ..et there has been a growing opiniop that all interpretative communities are created 
equal and that the pains of becoming an informed reader are needless. Many critics 
focus on what the text means to the individual rather than what the text meant to the 
intended audience. It does seem logical that· the usage of a text is found in its relation 
to the indivi<:fual reading it but only if this "usage" is rooted in entertainment. As 
literary scholars, our calling is not.to.tbring !fhe warmth of the book club into the 
classroom but to apply.disciplined study to works ofliteratuie.·We all have.favored 
texts that "speak to" us and our experiences, but our primary aim should be 
knowledge acquisition and nor entertainment. As theorists· we must say that the text's 
illocutionary linguistic intention trumps our own emotional attachment when it comes 
to ascribing meaning. After all, if response becomes meaning and response is 
necessarily relative; then why pursue intention? Why bother becoming informed'2 1 
Why attend American Lit class at all?  
Deconstruction places interpretation squarely in the gap between' sign and 
signified while Reader Response places it in the gap between text and reader. As 
Louise Rosenblatt once said, interpretation is a "transactional process" between text 
and interpreter in which the text is merely a tool to elicit past experience (Bressler 
66). How can one expect unity in such an environment? 
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When one's primary tool for unlocking textual meaning is subjective 
experience, it is easy to see how.most modem theories may be considered types of 
reader response. As mentioned in the previous:; chapter, Marxism is merely a form of 
response that comes. from an interpretative community whose fixation with power and 
economics looms largejn its reading. Similarly, Feminism is the response from an 
interpretative community of feminists, Psychoanalysis is the response from a 
Freudian, Lacanian, or Jungian community, etc. As long as interpretation begins with 
the reader, it will be a type of Reader Response. Deconstructionism begins outside the 
reader (tackling language itself) and New Criticism tries to stay strictly within the 
parameters of the autotelic text, but most.other theories begin.with their own 
presuppositions -and seek evidence of them in the text-regardless of�uthorial 
intention} 1 
The natural result of all of this is that textual meaning is up for grabs. Even 
within theories one finds much variation and debate. It is often said, for example, that 
no theorist belongs to strictly one school or another but each is an eclectic blend of 
approaches. What we end up doing is applying a given lens to a text because we feel 
1 1  I am by no means calling for a return to New Criticism. My claim is that if one begins outside of the 
text, he or she should look to those sources which reconstruct the historic, cultural, and linguistic 
attitudes that comprise the text's historic moment. Moreover, when examining a text that is far 
removed from one's own culture (e.g. the Lukan text) he must factor in outside voices in order to hear 
clearly the text's original message (i.e. its Sinn). 
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that the text lends itself to such a reading. Our allegiance varies depending on what 
book we happen to be engaging. Moreover, no school of criticism, with the possible 
exception of the New Critics, has a codified set of rules, an established methodology, 
or one orthodox way to go about interpreting a text. One cannot come to any 
definitive answers about a text because of the inherent relativism of the process we 
call literary analysis. One cannot prove that one's reading is the superlative one 
because so many posit that as long as you have textual evidence to support you, you 
cannot be wrong. All of this has come about because we've denied Sinn, celebrated 
Bedeutung, and have destroyed any objectivity within our discipline. Hirsch was spot 
on when he claimed that championing Bedeutung and making meaning an inherently 
subjective thing-living and in flux-"simply destroys the basis both for any 
agreement among readers and for any objective study whatever (1 688)." There may 
not be one absolute interpretation for a text but some readings-those that originate 
from a proper theoretical starting point-are more ideal than others. 
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Chapter 3 
Ideology and Theory 
By now the reader is most likely demanding an explication of my own theory. 
We've had our fun dismantling the flawed presuppositions of other schools but can I 
do any better, myself? I begin with the admission that mine is a doxastic practice 
whose roots are in the rich soil of Marxist theory and New Historicism. Following in 
the steps of Karl Marx, Louis Althusser, Terry Eagleton, and others, I focus 
predominantly on ideology and its relationship to artistic craft. There has been a 
steady evolution within Marxist theory and although many people still believe that we 
reduce the canon to a simplistic clash between haves and have-nots, most Marxists 
hold a complex a.Qd stratified view of social interaction. 12  All too often, the Marxist 
literary theory is confused with the socialist government system as if the two were 
inseparable. Perhaps this is why many Marxists readily traded labels when the 
followers of Stephen Greenblatt married his New Historicism to their own practice 
and called the union "Cultural Materialism" (Bressler 241 ). Regardless of title, we 
scholars view literature from a wide-angle lens and employ literary analysis as a 
means of uncovering knowledge about humanity itself. It is no surprise that an 
interdisciplinary approach is practically required in this type of doxastic practice. 
12 It would be truly amazing if all texts were merely retellings of Dr. Seuss' Star-Bellied Sneeches, but 
this is not how we Marxists do things. 
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In the last chapter, I mentioned that despite his excellent arguments, there are 
aspects ofHirsch's approach with which I disagree. Although I find Sinn and 
Bedeutung very useful classifications, I think that Sinn should not be restricted to the 
author's conscious intention. There are social implications-what one might venture 
to call an ideological intent-that arise prior to and during the writing process. This 
ideological intentionality is, in many ways, independent of the author and predates 
both author and Sinn. Ideology saturates the mind and the language of the human and 
it is bound up in both meaning and significance. Individuals are the product of their 
historic moment and, in many ways, History is an author whose text is humanity. 
Authors presuppose that certain phrases and styles will not need unpacking 
and that shared presuppositions exist between themselves and the ideal reader. This 
sociolinguistic presupposition demands Fish's ideal interpretative community. To be 
ideal, a reader must be as knowleqgeable about the ideology of a language as 
possible. Michel Foucault claims that "verbal clusters [are] discursive layers which 
fall outside the familiar categories of a book, a work, or an author'' (1 622). The Sinn, 
in short, is only fully realized after the encoded ideology-which transcends 
conscious intent-is appreciated within the text. 
A Crash Course in Cultural Theory 
"Literature," we are told, "is the process and result of [ . . .  ] composition within 
the social and formal properties of language" (Williams 1 568). This seemingly 
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obvious remark has powerful connotations in literary discussion. Ifliterature i s  the 
result of a language's social properties, then we need to define what those properties 
are. Languages are purveyors of ideology, a point championed by sociolinguists and 
Marxists alike. According to the famous linguist Benjamin Whorf, 
formulation of ideas is not an independent process, strictly rational in 
the old sense, but is part of a particular grammar [ . . .  ] .  We dissect 
nature by lines laid down by our native languages. The categories that 
we isolate from the world of phenomena we do not find there because 
they stare every observer in the face; on the contrary, the world is 
presented in a kaleidoscopic flux of impressions which has to be 
organized by our minds-and this means largely by the linguistic 
systems in our minds. We cut up nature, organize its concepts [ . . .  ] 
largely because [of] an agreement that holds throughout our speech 
community and is codified in the patterns of our language. The 
agreement is, of course, an implicit and unstated one, but its terms are 
absolutely obligatory; we cannot talk at all except by subscribing to 
the organization and classification of data which the agreement 
decrees. ( qtd in W ardhaugh 221 )  
This statement, the so-called Sapir-Whorfhypothesis, has had a great impact on its 
field. Human society is influenced by language and vice versa. There is a tacit 
agreement among members of speech communities 1 3 ,  a shared set of assumptions 
about life that permeates their words. Culture's effect on language has not gone 
unnoticed by literary critics. A common belief among Marxists is that "there is an 
ideological dimension to every signification" (Hebdige 2454). 
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Pierre Bourdieu asserts that "a work of art has meaning and interest only for 
someone who possesses the cultural competence, that is, [the understanding of] the 
code, into which it is encoded" ( 1 8 1  0). In other words, the ideal interpretive 
community must have access to the linguistic code of the author-a feat which often 
requires extra-textual, historic sources. The ideological code that is carried in our 
writings is, for the most part, unconscious. We have been indoctrinated to such a 
degree that we rarely realize how great an impact our culture has had on us. Formerly, 
Marxists held that ideology saturated a culture in a top-down manner, originating in 
the bourgeoisie and trickling down to the proletariat through the v:arious institutions 
that made up the superstructure (Marx 771 -72). This overly simplistic model, which 
assumes a one-way cultural transaction, has been jettisoned in recent incarnations of 
the theory. 
Whereas Marx implies a dissection of society into two major groups, others 
posit many subcultures-each with its own construction of power, stratification, and 
Weltanschauung-that exist within a system whose pace is set by an empowered 
13 A speech community is "any human aggregate characterized by regular and frequent interaction by 
means of a shared body of verbal signs and set off from similar aggregates by significant differences in 
language usage" (Gumperz 219). 
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group which wields hegemonic control (Jameson 1 947). S o  while the major points of 
a culture's ethos may be set by the sceptered elite (hereafter referred to as the 
"hegemonic group"), structures of power differ from subgroup to subgroup. These 
subgroups consciously and unconsciously mirror the hegemonic group. 14 
Cultural rule is maintained as long as the hegemonic group '"succeed[ s] in 
framing all competing definitions within [its] range, ' so that subordinate groups are, if 
not controlled, then at least contained within an ideological space [ . . .  ] which appears 
[ . . .  ] to be permanent and 'natural, '  [and] to lie outside of history" (Hebdige 2455). 
Here we see the subtlety of social interaction. The empowered group maintains 
control not through despotic measures, but through crafting the shared ideology. A 
certain degree of internal colonization occurs, subordinate groups unwittingly buying 
into those (bourgeois) values which hold them in check simply because they have 
been trained to see those values as normative. Hegemonic control of the masses . 
is hidden from the consciousness of the agents of production (i.e. the 
proletariat). The failure to see through appearances to the real relations 
which underlie them does not occur as the direct result of some kind of 
masking operation consciously carried out by individuals, social 
groups, or institutions. On the contrary, ideology by definition thrives 
beneath consciousness. It is here, at the level of 'normative common 
sense,' that ideological frames of reference are most firmly sedimented 
14 An example from Sociologuistics might be the adoption of Received Pronunciation in Great Britain 
or the advent of Network English here in the ' States (Wardhaugh 45-46). 
and most effective, because it is here that their ideological nature is 
most effectively concealed. 1 5  (Hebdige 2452) 
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The issue of"common sense" i s  very important. Common sense knowledge is, 
sociolinguistically speaking, a set of assumptions shared by a community which may 
or may not be true but are largely uncontested among the constituent members 
(Wardhaugh 252-53). By controlling the avenues to power, the hegemonic group not 
only sets itself up as an example for other groups to imitate (thus ensuring its own 
longevity), but its values saturate the superstructure and unconsciously influence 
others. 
In The Social Construction of Reality, sociologists Peter Berger and Thomas 
Luckmann explain that 
society, identity and reality are subjectively crystallized in the same 
process of internalization. This crystallization is concurrent with the 
internalization of language. Indeed, for reasons evident from [ . . .  ] 
observations in language, language constitutes both the most important 
content and the most important instrument of socialization. ( 1 33) 
From the slightly different vantage point of a sociologist, we see corroboration of the 
Marxist and Whorfian claims about culture's influence on language. At the time when 
individuals internalize their identity and their reality they are concurrently 
internalizing language. Moreover, as a socializing tool, language carries cultural 
15 For more on this, see Althusser's Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses, particularly pp 1489-
9 1 .  
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connotation. Louis Althusser, famous for his concept of ldeological State Apparatuses 
(ISAs), points out that literature is a tool through which the hegemonic group 
maintains its hold over others ( 1489). In sum, language and literature serve to 
maintain and perpetuate a culture's dominant ideology (Eagleton 2243; Jameson 
1 944). This fact has profound effect on our concept of interpretation. 
For the typical Marxist, literary analysis is an evaluation of the text in such a 
way that a "prior historical or ideological subtext" is uncovered, "it being understood 
that that 'subtext' is not immediately present, as such, not [as] some common-sense 
external reality [ . . .  ] but rather [it] must itself always be (re )constructed after the fact" 
(Jameson 1 945). We know that language encodes more than the speaker's conscious 
intent. We also know that a proper understanding of a message involves knowledge of 
what is unspoken-what is implied, taken for granted, or unconsciously imbedded in 
one's Weltanschauung. We know, in short, that meaning is not coextensive with 
intent. 
The Task at Hand 
Sometimes ideological elements are consciously incorporated in our texts. My 
shifting use of male and female pronouns, for instance, is an example of how the 
gender egalitarianism of my own ideology is consciously reflected in my words. 
Much of our ideology, however, is unconscious. Whether conscious or not, ideology 
is present and it effects Sinn. Deep ideology theory does not threaten Hirsch's 
argument because a past culture's ideology is changeless (locked forever in the text' s  
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temporal moment) and, I argue, i t  is  an important pait of Sinn. The ideology that 
controlled the language and craft of a given author is a solid, frozen· �ntity'that we can 
uncover through linguistic examination of the text (and of extra-textual items that 
betray the cultural influences on the author's moment). 
The Marxist has to ask herself how. far.she wants culture theoiy to influen�e .. 
her methodology: Is it important to discovelf if the author is- a member of the . J 
hegemonic group or of a.subordinate group';t I£ so, ho.w does one determine this? If 
ideology is so deeply entr.:ench-e(i., 'Can one truly.and effectively speak out against 
dominant cultural values? Following the implications ofWhorf, we may safely 
conclude that for an individual to be relevant, i .e., to utilize language effectively, she 
must agree with at least some of the culture's ideological presuppositions. Every 
individual buys into some parts of the hegemony. It is possible for someone-to speak 
against her cultural ethos, but she cannot extricate herself entirely from the ideology. 
Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari facilitate our-discussion with their aoncept 
of"minor literature." A minor literature, according to these critics, is "that which a 
minority constructs within a·major language," and' a main "characteristic of minor 
literatures is that everything in them is political [ . . .  ,] the social ·milieu serving as 
[more] than a mere environment or backdrop" (Deleuze and Guattari 1 598), %u&' a 
minority text will be one which is so aware of its status that it holds politics in mind 
at all times. Such a literature is ideal for examining ideological influences on a text 
because its purpose i� partly to contest the hegemony. In such. a text' we: could see 
where the attempt at disassociation succeeds (i.e., where a marked break with 
hegemonic values and -beliefs appears) and where it fails (i.e., where the ingrained 
hegemony is so deep that the author is unaware that she is. supporting it). Antonio 
Gramsci writes that 
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one ofthe most important characteristics of any group that is 
developing tow'ard dominance is its struggle to assimilate and. conquer 
'ideologically' the traditional intellectuals, but this assimilation and 
conquest is made quicker and more efficacious the more the group in 
question succeeds in simultaneously elaborating its own organic 
intellectuals. ( 1 14 1 )  
In light of this, w e  may say that i f  a minority group wishes to gain power, i t  will 
breed its own intellectuals and will seek ways to define itself against the hegemonic 
group, while at the same time seeking to convert the intellectuals of other subgroups 
to its cause. 
In a given society, there are relatively few people who have enough autonomy 
to break from linguistic constraints and the hegemonic group's influence. As 
Bernstein puts it, "historically and now, only a tiny percent of the population has been 
socialized into knowledge at the level of [ . . .  ] control" ( 1 63-68). So a majority of 
people will never truly transcend the ideology-infused constraints of their primary 
language. 
But what about a burgeoning religious group? Surely a cult-which defines 
itself against the status quo- is the most capable and the most willing to break away 
from linguistic and social constraints. Religious groups, since they are generally 
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zealous in nature, are the most likely to nurture their own intellectuals and to 
proselytize the intellectuals of other subgroups. If we could locate an evangelistic, 
counter-cultural religious group whose leaders have captured its budding ideology in a 
text, we could very easily put our theory to the test. "The Gospel According to Luke" 
offers us such an opportunity. In the Lukan text we see Christianity' s  attempts to define 
itself against the immediate Judaic backdrop and the larger Hellenistic ideology. 
44 
Part II: The Third Gospel and Ideology 
Chapter 4 
Luke as General Historiography: Genre, Audience, and Authorship 
Our analysis of Luke shall begin with its genre for through determining where 
the Lukan text exists on the literary spectrum, we can draw conclusions about its 
intended audience and the degree to which it fulfills or defies expectations of craft. 
Frederick Danker claims that Luke is an "aretology," a term derived from the Greek 
arete, which concerns the "role played by deities [and leaders] in the welfare of their" 
followers (3). Although it is true that aretological elements exist in Luke, the general 
consensus is that this gospel is more accurately a type of Greco-Roman 
historiography known as "general history" (Danker 25). David Aune explains that this 
type ofliterature charts "the important historical experiences of a single national 
group from [its] origin to the recent past" (88). The reader would do well to note the 
similarity of this concept and minor literature. The two, for our purposes, are 
synonymous. The early Christians were not, strictly speaking, a political nation but 
their communal tendencies, strange rites, and cult status mark them as such for all 
practical sociological purposes. Luke, or more accurately Luke-Acts, is specifically 
desigrled to chronicle the birth of .a new people; h rlew.'iideQJogy,: and a new social 
paradigm16• , 1 
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According1tcr Joel Green� we may expect an historiograpHic text to give 
prominence to-recent history while �'determined research is placed in�the:seooce of 
pet:stlasive.and,engaging instruction'? ( 6). General histories con�em themselv.es :with 
"veracity" and "narrative" so. that the truth of what happened is put into a coherent, 
teleological order (Green ·15).1 Thus �e may .e�pect.an authonsuch as Luke ta be more 
concerned. with arranging the narrative alongJines of-causation thm along· lines of' 
objective chronologyt Luke assumes .that the facts of his text are cm;nmon knowledge 
and wil) remain relatively uncontested and so he focuses instead on ".tne sequencing 
of events and the interpretive aim that weaves its 'Way forward throug}rnarrative, 
surfacil)g here and there while lurking beneath the story elsewhere" (Green· }5). 
Luke's  authoriaf intention is not to convince Theophilus that Jesus' incarnation� 
ministry, and resurrection happened but to explain to him·why. all o:fthistis important 
and why Christ should be honored. 
Bearing in mind that narrative·was privileged over veracity, we see a•small but 
obvious break from Synoptic tradition in Luke's  general history. In the fifth chaptei; 
we are introduced to·a paralytic who is lowered by his friends through a, hole cut-into 
the roof of a house where Jesus is performing miracles (Luke ·5. 1 9). �ffi the-Matthew 
16 It is taken for granted, by most scholars, that Luke and Acts are two halves'6fone.generalhistory 
(Keener 1 85; Gteeri 6;:Danker 1 ). For our purposes, hpwever, we need not concern:oursel1<es with the 
book of Acts-Luke offers enough conscious and unconscious ideoldgy. 
and Mark versions of,the.story'l the men cut the-hole through a thatched roof, but 
Luke changes the thatch to Greco-Roman tile (E>anker 122; Mark 2.4; .Luke;2. 1 8, 
Matt. 24. 1 7). In other words, Luke deviates from·his source for the sake.of cultural 
relevance. Althougll this gospel is placed in its necessary Jewish frame, Luke 
implicitly and explicitly tips his hat to hegemonic Roman language and values to 
make and substantiate his claims. 
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Luke opens his general history with a·preface that follows Greco-Roman 
convention to the letter.· In it we find the expected dedication, "remarks regarding the 
subject matter, its importance and implications, { . . .  ) mention of its predecessors, a 
claim to appropriate methodology, and [then] the transition to the work itself' (Green 
34). Although we do not know who Theophilus was; we may conclude from his 
patron position and his designation as "Most Excdlent"·(laatiste), that he was 
wealthy and perhaps a member of high society (Keener. 1 87). So from anal )'Zing the 
style, form, and diction, we may,fuhclude that ·.tuke was an educated .author, writing 
to an urbane audience in the conventional way. 1 7  
Luke's  historiography is  6lso.typical of  its genre through its use of sources. 
Craig Keener explains that historiography ''usually started with one main source and 
wove in material from another source or sources" ( 1 87). In Luke' s  case, the main 
17 There is little need to go into the exact identity of Luke much more than this fQf th,e text reveals 
enough about him to give us an idea of his aims and abilities. Gepnane to our discussion is not Luke':; 
original vocation but his role as a religious authority and Christian historian. Whether or not he was a 
physician has little bearing on our topic except, perhaps, to mention that Luke seems to emphasize 
miraculous healing more than the other Gospels and uses an educated style of writing. 
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source was Mark's Gospel and the secondary source was Q, that ubiquitous oral or 
written catalogue of religious sayings that now survives only in those books of 
scripture which quote it (Keener 1 87). It should be said, however, that although 
Luke's  gospel is typical of its type in many ways, it sometimes consciously deviates 
from the norm. 
The elevated style of the Prologue is jettisoned in the fifth verse. Here we see 
Luke adapting to the "Hebraic rhythms" of the so-called Septuagint style (Keener 
1 87). As Danker says, it is as if 
Intent on bridging Jewish and gentile religious-cultural experience 
[Luke] abandons the lofty [Greek style] and [ . . .  ] at the same time, he 
formulates his narrative in such a way that Greco-Roman audiences 
could make contact with material that would otherwise have been 
dismissed as tales recited in an unknown tongue. In this way Luke 
reaches out to [both] Jew and gentile [ . . .  ] .  In brief Luke takes account 
of the evocative power possessed by a literary work and shows 
awareness of the cultural models that various publics might bring as 
instruments for interpreting such a work. (3) 
Though a Gentile, Luke demonstrates a deep knowledge of Judaism that is articulated 
in such a way that it doesn't lose relevance in Greek circles (Danker 1 ). This 
maneuver testifies to Luke's mastery of literary craft and rhetoric. Moreover, we may 
infer that.just as Luke is a converted Greco-Roman intellectual, his aim is to convince 
and convert other intellectuals. 
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Luke's decision to write in Septuagint Greek has an effect that "is something 
like that of a contemporary sermon delivered in the style of the King James" English, 
which would request the Greek reader to respect Jews because of their ancient 
traditions {Danker 27). This is very interesting. Luke tries to validate Judaism in 
Rome's eyes through merging elevated Greek and historic Hebrew styles. Though he 
pays homage to the power of these groups, it cannot be forgotten that Luke's text is 
supposedly designed to establish and defend a new group--the Christians. Within the 
gospel's genre itself we see the complex game of respect and rhetoric that is needed 
in order to validate a burgeoning ideology. Luke fits within a well-established genre, 
for 
many general histories were written by 'barbarian' intellectuals who 
wished to communicate to the Greeks the achievements (and 
superiority) of their native lands. The writing of such histories reflects 
a national consciousness of a people united (particularly in opposition 
to [ . . .  ] Romans) by language, geography, and customs. (Aune 89) 
The very tradition that Luke consciously operates within demands a close scrutiny of 
ideology and language. 
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Chapter 5 
Conscious Ideology: Hellenism and the Linguistics ofPower 
Luke is a member of the Greco-Roman macro-culture by virtue of his Gentile 
status and a member of the Hebrew micro-culture by virtue ofhis historian role and 
his impressive knowledge of Jewish lore1 8 . It is not surprising, therefore, that his 
argument for Christ' s importance would use the concept of "beneficence" which was 
prized by both groups (Danker 4). Here we see a conscious use of ideological values 
to substantiate the Christian claim of Jesus' divinity and historic importance. 
Beneficence was an important Roman virtue and sometimes aretologies were 
written just for philanthropists (Danker 3). This virtue, closely tied to honor and 
justice was almost always associated with the divine. Panker tells us that 
because deities in the Greco-Roman world were evaluated in terms of 
their beneficence, Luke stresses that the God of Israel is the ultimate in 
philanthropic excellence, the Supreme Benefactor. [ . . .  ] Since 
uprightness and a sense of justice are among the primary attributes 
celebrated in [ . . .  ] Greco-Roman honorary documents, Luke exhibits 
I S  Also, it could be argued that the lines between the two groups were blurred by the Roman 
occupation of lsrael and the subsequent Hellenization of the Jews. One would always be aware to 
which group one belonged to, but obvious cultural diffusion occurred. 
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these explicitly and implicitly as the dominating features of [ . . .  ] Jesus 
Christ. (5) 
Many scholars have thought that Luke was a physician-a conclusion supported by 
his educated style and his fixation on healing miracles (including some which do not 
occur in the other gospel accounts) (Green 2 1 ). Regardless ofhis past career, healing 
in this cultural context was considered the ultimate act ofbeneficence and Luke's  
emphasis on Jesus as a healer would mark Christ as  a very important and virtuous 
individual (Danker 7). 
Jesus as the Honorable Man 
Central to the Hellenist ideology was the notion of honor (time)-a concept 
that had much more significance then than it does now. As Seneca puts it, "that which 
is honorable is held dear for no other reason than because it is honorable" ( qtd in de 
Silva 22). Men and women valued honor above pleasure, above personal safety, and 
above profit. According to Quintilian, it was the primary factor in rhetorical 
persuasion (de Silva 24). So, for instance, when Luke has Jesus use the honor-laden 
challenge-riposte system of debate to silence his detractors, the reader should take 
note. The significance of this social tactic is lost on those readers who are ignorant of 
the ideological weight that honor carried in Luke's  day. 
Although it may be foreign to many of us, the honor-obsessed, "agonistic" 
culture of the Greco-Romans is still very much alive today (de Silva 29). In such a 
society, honor can be won or lost through debate in a public forum. David de Silva 
explains that 
5 1  
the challenge-riposte is essentially an attempt to gain honor at 
someone else's expense by publicly posing a question that cannot be 
answered. When a challenge has been posed, the challenged must 
make some sort of response (and no response is [ . . .  ] considered a 
[negative] response). It falls to the bystanders to decide whether or not 
the challenged person successfully defended his [ . . .  ] own honor. (29) 
When Christ interacts with Pharisees, Sadducees, and other teachers of the law, it is 
often in a challenge-riposte situation. 
Challenge-Riposte: Christ the Rhetorician 
Consider Luke's thirteenth chapter. Here we see Jesus confronted by a 
synagogue official for healing a woman on the Sabbath. The official challenges Christ 
by saying to the crowd, "there are six days in which work should be done; so come 
during them to be healed, and not on the Sabbath day" (Luke 1 3. 14). Jesus' riposte is 
found in the next two verses. He says, 
You hypocrites, does not each of you on the Sabbath untie his ox or 
his donkey from the stall and [ . . . ] water him? And this woman [ . . . ] 
should she not have been released from [Satan's] bond on the 
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Sabbath? As he said this, all his opponents were being humiliated; and 
the entire crowd was rejoicing [ . . .  ] .  ( 1 3 . 1 5-1 7) 
Jesus' answer is a crafty one, beginning with a metaphor that would resonate with the 
crowd and then concluding that his actions were not a violation of Sabbath 
restrictions but were in reality an act ofbeneficence. We see that the official is 
shamed·and that Jesus, by.virtue of the people's response, is the winner. 
Another Sabbath healing in the next chapter results in Jesus gaining e¥,en 
more honor. In this case, Jesus initiates the game, asking the lawyers and Pharisees 
whether it is legal to heal on the Sabbath ( 14.3). The resulting silence indicates that 
these men are unable to defend themselves, thus forfeiting their honor. According to 
Green, this particular group of Pharisees held an '"advanced social position" because 
they had scribes among them (547). We may safely conclude, then, that winning the 
game against such a prestigious group was quite a statement. Had we not known the 
important social function of the challenge-riposte system, we would have greatly 
underestimated this interchange and others. 
Luke loves challenge-riposte interactions. In the twentieth chapter we see the 
religious establishment asking where Jesus' authority originates and he, in tum, 
asking them about John's baptism. Luke writes, 
On one of the days while He was teaching the people in the temple and 
preaching the gospel, the chief priests and the scribes with the elders 
confronted him and they spoke, saying to Him, ' tell us by what 
authority you are doing these things, or who is the one who gave You 
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this authority? Jes.us.answered and said·tQ·tb,em�/I"will also ask you a 
. .  � • 1 question, and you. tell Me: "Was the baptisnl of JohnJrom heaven or 
. ,from,menr' (20 d -4) 
The readeJ> .should note how the priests, scribes, and elders asked Jesus this question 
in front .of aJarge:group. 'of.onlook.ers. Luke directs attention to Christ's po,Pularity, 
<lr.awing such esteemed. attention. 'Clearly this is ·an ifiStance of challenge and riposte. 
Jesps gets the better ofihem,.howeves. Ihe. pro.:-John crowd wiH·not name them:yictor 
if.they answer the otreN�ay and Jesus will have a snappy retort if they answer the 
other� Stuck between losing to Christ and risking their lives (which, according to the 
rules, would make Jesus the winner an)lWay), they are forced to abandon their efforts. 
So that it1is not construed as a draw, LJ.Ike contrasts the. priests' "we do not know" 
with JesusL"J am not telling," implying that he knows the..answ.er while they claim 
not to. Other examples abound. 
In. Luke chapter six, we see only Jesus' side of a riposte interaction. After 
asking him 'about' eating grain ori the Sabbath, the Pharisees and scribes are strangely 
silent for the next few ..verses (Luke.6. 1-J). We may assume that the rage they express 
in verse eleven is. due to this' silence coupled 'With their inability to meet Christ's; 
challenge or explain his healing miracle (Luke 6.9-1 0). Luke demonstrates the 
superiority of Christ by having him win a double portion of the Pharisees' honor in 
one interaction. 
Later Chris.t is challenged again only this .time the Pharisees have planted in 
the crowd "spies who pretended to be righteous in order that they might catch him in 
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some [seditious] statement" so that, by his riposte, they . .could make him appear guilty 
in the eyes of Rome (Luke 20.20). The religious elite stood to win Christ's honor 
through the expected silence or through the subsequent' arrest,should.his riposte. prove 
too political. It i's no smalL wonder that they are shocked into silence when Cpris,t 1 
answers their question about taxes· by saying "render unto Caesar the things.-w:hich are 
Caesar'.s and to God the things. which are Goct:s" (20.25-26). Jesus' answer\ is 
enigmatic enough to amaze..the crowd and·tto. S'eem politicallytinnocuous. Similarly in 
the next few verses, Christ evades the Sadducees trap about marriage in the aftetlife 
by asserting that those ·in heaven ao not marry but are like the angels (20.36). It is 
important to note two things in this case. 
The first is that the question was purely rhetorical since the Sadducees denied 
any form of afterlife (Luke 20'.27). The second is that in 'lerse thirty-seven Christ 
grounds his reply in the words·ofMoses, a particularly beloved patriarch. ·For the 
Sadducees to refute this they would have to deny a substantial part of their Christ 
tradition. Thus Christ explodes the Sadducees argument while demolishing their 
future credibility. Luke depicts Jesus warning his disciples about the scribes in. the 
next verse and, throughout the book, he highlights how Christ can detect the logic of 
the scribes' .challenges to avoid entrapment. In this way Luke paints Jesus as a 
particularly good rhetorician, making him more appealing to his audience. By 
depicting Jesus as a master of rhetoric, Luke crowns him with honor upon honor, all 
the while increasing the "honorability" of the Christian message. 
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.Kinship and.Ancestrjl 
: I 
Q Kirtship, 'a third componept of the Hellenistic i'deology,Js.as iipportant.as 
beneficence and honor. The Jews•piided themselves on being GOd'.s cliose:n..people 
and ..sup.sequently privileged gertealogy anchfamily ties: One can see, for .instance,· 
how the,Saaduct;es\vould be.reluc1ant.t��ay anything-disparaging about Muses. ·· 
Kinship;.after:all, bestows a:cectain amount ofhereoitary honor on an individual, a 
concept that is as important in Greco-Roman culture as it is to Hebrew culture. De 
Silva writes tnat "people. are not' just free-floating individual� out there in the 
[Roman] world but are located within larger constellations of 'family'" and "their 
merits begin with [ . . .  ] 'the reputation of their ancestral house" ( 1 58). Luke's account 
of Christ's genealogy·traces "the line'OfJoseph back to Adam and thus-back to God. 
It is a genealogical argument· for the universality that Luke will claim for G::hrist' s  
rule"·(de Silva 1 61 }. 
While Luke may use kinship positively to make his case for Jesus' rule, he has 
his characters apply kinship negatively to certain religious officials. The phrase 
"brood of vipers" is used by John the Baptist and, according to de Silva, this 
particular epithet was "the most virulent of insults available to people in tbe ancient 
world" ( 163). Jesus also attacks the lawyers by saying that it was their. ·�fathers" whb 
killed the prophets (Luke 1 1 .47). It is difficult for1he modern reader to grasp the 
depth' of ignominy that such insults would imply. Through kinship-as through 
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honor, and beneficence Luke establishes Jesus and Christianity's  new ideology as 
believable and honorable while attacking the flaws of its Judaic source. 
Just as Luke. twists concepts of ancestry to make Jesus divinely important and 
to cast a shadow of ill repute onto the scribes, he also twists traditional narrative 
archetypes to make the new sect of Christianity stand out against the larger Jewish. 
backdrop. A very clear example of this. appears early on in the book. Perhaps..an in' .. 
depth look at portions of Luke's  first chapter will flesh out this point. 
What Luke Really Meant: Considering Mary and Zechariah 
To begin our discussion, it is important to bear in mind that a disinterested 
view ofhistory and the so-called objectivism ofhistbrians are modem 'trappings that 
cannot fairly be assigned to ancient authors. As Luke is more often read as a religious 
or historical text than as a skillfully crafted literary work, people often 'Overlook:his 
symbolism and the structure of his. gospel. Because ofthis, many fail to see the 
significance of the parallel between Zechariah and Mary in Luke's first chapter. 
Zechariah's  silence, scholars tell. us; serves to act as the sign' he requested in verse 1 8  
and as punishment for his disbelief (Green 79). Green discusses how Mary asks a 
very similar question and is answered with impunity because she reacted with belief 
in verse 45 and not doubt (89). I find Green's  explanation unsatisfactory because it 
i I 
oversimplifies to the point of distraction. 
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The.difference·oetween.the two questions .is semantic and, as far as the 
message is concerned, trivial. In verse I 8, Zechariah asks how he wjll know the 
message "for certain." In verse 34 Mary's words are, "how can this be7'' Both queries 
betray the speaker's doubt about the validity of Gabriel's message. B9th follow up the 
question with a·statement of rationale;�Zechariah cites his age and Mary her '!irginity 
as obstacles to the prophecies' ·fulfillment. In both the content and the argument of the 
message, the two express tl.1e same.basic doubt..Green tries to escape this by claiming 
that Gabriel was privy to an insight that is·denied the reader (79). l 9  While the theist 
may .very well-believe this, the. scholar is forced to substantiate it and the text does not 
help much in this matter. Theology renders the point moot through the "dual 
authorship" claim that the fallible words of men (e.g., Luke). are rendered infallible by 
the divine authorship of the Holy Spirit working within the human. While this view is 
a fascinating one that I myselfbelieve, it often diverts attention from the human 
author and textual implications. At the risk of sounding like a New Critic, I think 
we'd do well to stick close to the text for in so doing we may find an alternative 
understanding. 
As mentioned above, Luke draws an obvious parallel between Mary and 
Zechariah (and his wife Elizabeth). On the one hand we find a fertile vir.gin and on 
19 To his credit, Green does discuss the parallel between these two characters but only to claim, that it 
was Luke's purpose to link John and Jesus together (84, 84). Green then goes on to discuss the 
contrasts between th two stories (with some intriguing insights) but still concludes that Zechariah had 
more doubt than Mary (84). 
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the other. a barren couple. Mary questions Gabriel 's  message and offers a counter 
argument. A few verses previous Zechariah had done the same. The interaction 
between human and divine messenger is an obvious parallel and we are meant to see 
it. We are also meant to see, however, the obvious differences in the parallel . ,Jt is not 
Elizabeth who receives the message but her husband. Given what we see in latter 
portions of Luke, the traditions and power structures of the Jews are not all 
necessarily translated into Jesus' Kingdom.of.God-particularly when it comes to 
wi>men and family. It becomes reasonaete; thence, to.assume that·the Zechariah 
incident is serving both a narrative and symbolic role. 
As verse five tells us, Zechariah was apci.est and a righteous man. Moreover, 
he and his barren wife echo Abraham and Sarah, the founders of the Hebrew people. 
Luke takes pains to paint this couple in a sympathetic light, telling us first of their 
righteousness and then later of their barrenness (Luke 1 .6-7). The story of Zechariah 
seems very much in keeping with traditional Jewish stories-a couple is barren, they 
seek the Lord, the Lord intervenes and sends them a special child. If we contrast this 
with the Mary narrative, we see something else entirely. Gabriel seems to violate the 
expected order of things. The angel is visiting a woman, thus beginning the validation 
of women seen throughout the entire book. Mary is not barren and she did not seek 
the Lord. Rather, she is singled out by the divine. Gabriel talks to her and not to her 
husband, opting to visit her before her marriage. The will of the Lord, in this matter, 
is to operate outside the normal bounds of the marriage institution-a fact which 
would (and did) shock Jewish sensibilities. Viewing this parallel in light of the entire 
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gospel, i t  becomes increasingly probable that Luke's intention was to show the 
similarities between Judaism and the Christian sect while at the same time 
highlighting the novelty and superiority of Christianity. Luke associates the old way 
with John and the new with Jesus, symbolically crowning Christianity as the better of 
the two. 
Just as Mary's unorthodox story deviates from the norm (represented liere by 
Zechariah), the Christian ideology will resemble the Jewish and yet will be notably 
different. Instead of reading theistic "metatextual" elements into the text, a more 
straightforward appreciation of Luke's use of parallels and symbolism allows literary 
craft to shine through. Moreover, this literary craft does not contradict the theistic 
reading and, if anything, serves to enrich it. 
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Chapter 6 
Unconscious Ideology: Deconstructing Luke 
What does deep ideology theory have to say about Luke? Are there any 
instances in which Luke insists that the Christian ideology contains x while his 
language betrays an unconscious adherence to Rome's y? We find in Luke two main 
examples, though others surely exist, where the radical elements ofhis gospel are 
undercut by the author's inability to stop thinking like the hegemonic group. 
If we return to the concepts ofkinship and honor, we find our first example of 
unconscious ideology. Central to Luke's text is the idea that identity is defined 
differently in the Kingdom of God. This is found both in the teachings of Christ and 
within the structure of the narrative itself. For instance, Jesus likens the people of the 
Kingdom to children (a gro,up that was essentially ignored and denied status until they 
came of age) so that his listeners might know that the kingdom is not a place where 
status matters (Luke 1 8. 1 5-1 7; Keener 239). In his famous Beatitudes, Jesus 
privileges the poor, the hungry, and the downtrodden above the wealthy and well fed. 
Also, looking at Luke's craft, we see a conscious effort to raise the status of 
widows and women. In the very first chapter, we see how barren Elizabeth is blessed 
with a child, setting the tone for the redemption of women theme in Luke. When 
Jesus is presented at the temple in the next chapter, we see Anna, an elderly widow, 
recognizing Jesus as the Messiah (Luke 2 .37). Luke incorporates women, particularly 
the barren and the widows, to enforce the redemptive nature of Christ's purpose. The 
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angel 's interchange with Mary, as discussed above, is also culturally atypical and 
would send a powerful message. When Gabriel greets Mary, ·he calls her "favored" 
and tells her that the "Lord is with her" ( 1 .28). It is not surprising that the next verse 
finds Mary "perplexed." After all, 
God often encouraged his servants that he was 'with' them. Greetings 
were normal, but rank and status determined whom one should greet 
and with what words. As both a woman and a young person (perhaps 
twelve or fourteen years old) and not yet married, Mary had virtually 
no social status. Neither the title ( 'favored' or 'graced one') nor the 
promise ('the Lord is with you') was traditional in greetings, even had 
she been a person of status. (Keener 1 90) 
Not only does Gabriel honor her beyond her station, he honors her as if she is more 
worthy than any other human. This would send shockwaves through both Jewish and 
Gentile audiences. 
Though his message might appear to be that the underprivileged are valued by 
God and a new era of egalitarianism is on the way, Luke's words undercut this. In 
contrast with his sources, Luke conspicuously leaves celebrated women (e.g. Ruth) 
out of Jesus' genealogy, knowing that his Greco-Roman audience would have more 
respect for an all-male chronology (Luke 3 .23-38). In chapter 8 we see prominent 
women financially supporting the ministry but we see none of them involved as 
disciples (3). When Peter's mother is healed of a fever, she immediately begins 
serving Jesus and his followers (4.39). It is implied that this is a good thing, testifying 
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to the potency of Christ's  miracles, but later Jesus praises the woman who neglects 
domestic chores in order to be instructed by him ( 1 0.41 -42). Moreover, though 
Gabriel and Elizabeth.call Mary "blessed," Jesus contradicts a woman in chapter 1 1  
when she·blesses his. mother, redirecting her blessing to "those who hear the word of 
God and observe it" ( 1 .28, 41 ; i }  .27-28). Which is it? Is woman man's equal, able to 
compr.ehend the Kingdom of God, or is she supposed to support the men and allow 
them to direct her destiny? It would appear that conscious intent is arguing for the 
former while ideological intent is arguing for the latter. 
An even stronger and perhaps more subconscious example of deep ideology 
undercutting Luke's message is his depiction of authority figures. In Christ' s  parable 
of the Rich Man and Lazarus, in his Beatitudes, and in numerous other instances, we 
see that God's Kingdom is one of flipped binaries. The rich languish in punishment 
while .the poor and the outcasts are invited to feasts ( 1 6. 1 9-:3 1 ;  14. 1 6-24). Examples 
of this privileging of society's  dregs are nearly as numerous as examples of Christ's 
indignation toward the wealthy, the self-righteous, and the aristocracy. To note all of 
these would be to cite the entire gospel. Suffice it to say that this flipped binary is the 
key to understanding what Jesus was all about. It is all the more startling, then, to see 
Luke's narrative defy this very premise. 
If we are not to look at the world through the eyes of social status, Luke's 
entire argument is suspect. Consider how he substantiates Jesus' authenticity. Though 
Jesus would explode-the conventional notions of kinship and lineage, Luke is careful 
to mention that John the Baptjst' s  father, Zechariah, is a priest "of the division of 
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Abijah" and that Jesus; presentation at the temple i� validafed:by·Siineon who was 
"righteous ·an& devout" '( l:5 ;'2:2)). Even in the example of .. vi:ctumis .women\cited 
above, .we are told that they are members of high social circles, proving that the 
message has reached the aristocracy (8.3). Luke draws on those with honor and status 
to validate the Christian message, surrounding Jesus with socially "reliable" 
characters. A perfect example of this is Christ's interaction with the centurion. 
In the seventh chapter, we see a high-status Roman centurion who not only 
requests Jesus' aid, but even claims that he is unworthy of receiving Christ in his 
house (1 -6). He says, "I am also a man placed under authority, with soldiers under 
me; and I say to this one, 'Go ! '  and he goes and to another, 'Come ! '  and he comes, 
and to my slave 'Do this ! '  and he does it" (7.8-1 0). A Roman of rank and privilege 
cedes authority to a Jew! There is no finer example of commandeering social 
stratification than this. In the Kingdom, it should not matter whether the man was a 
centurion or a leper, rich or poor, Jew or Gentile. Christ came to defy categories of 
power, not to use them to his advantage. Here we see Luke placing an apolitical 
Messiah in a blatantly political situation. Although Christ did apparently cure the 
man's child, it seems to undercut his anti-status message to craft the moment in such a 
calculated way. Clearly Luke is thinking along lines consistent with hegemonic 
expectations and a Roman system of values, rather than according to the Christian 
ideology he purportedly believes. My point is not that Luke is out to hoodwink us or 
that he was not a Christian believer. Rather, I merely point out that his Roman 
ideology is unavoidable and, particularly in a conventional genre like historiography, 
it is to be expected that he would come off sounding more Roman than he'd like. 
Luke' s  deep ideology saturates his text and we, centuries removed, are more able to 
see it than he was. 
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Conclusion 
Although I could continue to dissect Luke, I feel enough has been brought to 
the table to substantiate my exegetical claims. We can safely assume that Luke was 
conscious ofhis actions when he wrote such radical things as Jesus' privileging the 
underclass while spurning the so-called righteous. We can equally assume that Luke's 
reliance on hegemonic rules of message substantiation sometimes violate Christ' s  
revolutionary claims. The ideology Luke seeks to describe and the ideology he 
secretly pays service to are perhaps equally important. What Luke means to say and 
what he actually says both contribute the Sinn of his gospel. 
In examining Luke, I have focused on a handful of examples of deep ideology 
at work. It was not my purpose to write an exhaustive social commentary on the 
gospel but simply to use Luke as a case study- a guinea pig for my theory. Many 
critics are reluctant to admit that an author has limited control over his or her text. 
Others would shrug off intentionality altogether, claiming that it adds little value to 
textual significance and is thus not worthy of our time. I set out to highlight the 
necessity and practicality of theory, to note the limitations of non-interdisciplinary 
doxastic practices, and to demonstrate how the social sciences (along with probability 
and pragmatism) point to an ideal theory that is decidedly New Historicist in 
appearance. Furthermore, I have stood on the shoulders of my Marxist forbears and 
have applied their thoughts to Biblical studies in an attempt to demonstrate the 
necessity of factoring ideology into an interpretation. 
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What are the implications of this? Meaning can be described as the sum of 
conscious authoria) intent and unconscious ideological intent. 8ne cannot divorce the 
human sciences from literary studies without sacrificing the second half of this 
equation. All too often readers focus on their own ideologies and seek to tease them 
out of a text, regardless of whether or not these ideologies were legitimately there .in 
the first place;. If is impossible to ever decode the entire set of ideological components 
in a given text since they would be as manifold and as layered as they are in -the 
human-wlio penned it. It is possible, however, to uncover quite a bit of the ideology­
particularly.when it is vastly different from our own. 
We err if we stubbornly assert that meaning and authorial intent are 
synonymous-the former contains the latter, but it is also a function of the historic 
moment of articulation, deeply infused with hegemonic values and constrained by 
language itself. Many are reluctant to admit that we are essentially slaves to our 
ideology. This is due, in part, to our society's fixation with autonomy and with our 
instilled fear that any controlling force which threatens this perceived autonomy is 
necessarily evil. It is all the more ironic that this autonomous individualism is 
communally indoctrinated into us at both the formal and informal level as ideological 
common sense. As literary scholars we should emulate the sociologist who endeavors 
to limit his value judgments when analyzing a foreign culture and forms his opinions 
from the expectations and rules of that people and not from those ofhis own. 
The purpose of the literary critic is very similar to that of the anthropologist. 
We are to view works ofliterature as social artifacts, using them to learn about the 
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people who wrote them. For literary students, reading should not be primarily 
entertainment and to view it as such is only to scratch the surface of texts. It is our 
obligation to humanity to use textual analysis as a vehicle for increasing our 
knowledge of ourselves and of our history. For a trained intellectual to shy away from 
this duty is to!f"ender his Master of English into an entertainer's Master o'f Ceremonies 
and the only philosophy he is worthy to be a doctor of is relativism. Sinn, ideological 
intent, and sound doxastic practices are necessary and important and subjective 
response, however intriguing, should not be the height of our textual interactions. If 
this project has added to the war on relativistic schools of interpretation and has 
convinced even one scholar to trade Derrida for Althusser or Eagleton, I consider it a 
success. 
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